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RESPONDENTS1 PETITION FOR REHEARING

Pursuant to Rule 35 of the Rules of the Utah Court of
Appeals, respondents, by and through their counsel of record,
respectfully

file

the

following

Petition

for

Rehearing

and

certify that the petition is presented in good faith and not for
delay.

FACTS

1.

On August 1, 1989, the Utah Court of Appeals, without a

hearing and in a memorandum decision, reversed the decision of
the trial court and held that according to Johnson v. Rogers, 763
P. 2d 771

(Utah 1988) a cause of action existed in Utah for

negligent

infliction

of

emotional

distress.

A

copy

of

the

memorandum decision is appended hereto.
2.

The court/ however, failed to rule whether plaintiff had

stated a cause of action under the zone-of-danger test adopted by
Johnson v. Rogers.
3.
either

The parties, anticipating that the court would adopt
the

impact

rule,

the

zone-of-danger

rule,

or

the

foreseeability rule, presented arguments on each issue.

ARGUMENT

I.
Standard for Rehearing
Rule 35 of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals provides
that a petition for rehearing should be granted
"overlooked or misapprehended" an issue.

if the court

Defendants1

petition

for rehearing should be granted in this case because the court
failed to address the issue of whether plaintiff had stated a
cause of action under the zone-of-danger rule.

II.
The court failed to address the issue of whether
plaintiff had stated a cause of action under the zoneof-danger rule.

2

When the briefs were filed in this case the Utah Supreme
Court had not yet handed down its decision in Johnson v. Rogers,
763 P.2d 771

(Utah 1988), a copy of which is appended hereto.

Therefore, the issue before the Court of Appeals was twofold:
(1) whether
infliction

a cause of action existed
of

emotional

distress;

in Utah

and

(2)

if

for negligent
so,

whether

plaintiff would be entitled to recover if the court adopted the
impact rule, the zone-of-danger rule, or the foreseeability rule.
In Johnson v. Rogers the Utah Supreme Court held that a cause of
action

existed

in Utah

for negligent

infliction of

emotional

distress and adopted Restatement (Second) of Torts § 313 (1965),
the zone-of-danger

rule.

Therefore, it is incumbent on this

court to decide whether plaintiff has stated a cause of action
under the zone-of-danger rule.
by both parties.

The issue was thoroughly briefed

See appellant's brief at 13-16; respondents'

brief at 13-16; reply brief at 3, 11-12.
Plaintiff argues that he has stated a cause of action under
the zone-of-danger rule because (1) he was in the same elevator,
(2) as a ten-year-old boy he perceived himself to be in danger,
and (3) had his friend's "experiment" been successful, he would
have tried riding up the outside of the elevator too.

As a

matter of law, these facts fall far short of meeting the zone-ofdanger test.

3

Discussing the

zone-of-danger test

Justice Durham stated:

in Johnson v. Rogers,

"The zone-of-danger rule

. . .

is an

obi ective standard and serves to identify in consistent fashion
those who are eligible to recover."
added).

Therefore,

whether

763 P.2d at 780 (emphasis

plaintiff

subjectively

perceived

himself to be in danger is irrelevant.
The fact that plaintiff was in the same elevator begs the
question.

He was

buttons, not

inside the

elevator

operating

the

control

riding up the outside of the elevator like his

friend, and was never in any physical danger of being crushed by
the elevator.

Plaintiff would only be in the zone of danger if

he were riding up the outside of the elevator.

The Restatement

defines zone of danger as being subjected to an "unreasonable
risk of bodily harm."

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 313(2), a

copy of which is appended hereto.

Plaintiff was never subjected

to a risk of bodily harm, not even when he was trapped inside the
elevator.
Plaintiff's

argument

that he was

in the

zone

of

danger

because, had his friend's experiment been successful, he would
have tried riding up the outside of the elevator too, is without
merit.
Although plaintiff may have experienced emotional distress,
he was simply not in the zone of danger.

4

When the Utah Supreme

Court adopted the zone-of-danger rule, Justice Zimmerman and the
other

concurring

conservative

justices

rule

that

knew

was

that

hard

they

to

were

justify

adopting

on

a

a

purely

theoretical basis, but they chose to adopt this rule until they
had

some

experience

with

the new

cause

of action.

Justice

Zimmerman wrote:
I recognize that some of the limitations inherent
in the "zone of danger" rule of section 313 are hard to
justify on a purely theoretical basis. Indeed, I have
serious concerns about the theoretical rationality of
any limits that can be imposed on liability for
negligent infliction of emotional distress.
Cf.
Hackford v. Utah Power & Light Co., 740 P.2d 1281, 1286
(Utah 1987)
(declining to recognize a loss-ofconsortium cause of action, in part because of the
difficulty of defining rational limiting principles).
However, section 313!s limitations seem to strike a
fair balance between the interests those injured have
in recovering damages and the interests of the courts
and the public in predictable rules. At some future
date, we may determine that there is merit in some of
the other approaches surveyed in Justice Durham's
opinion.
However, until we have had experience with
the cause of action, I conclude that it is best to take
the more conservative approach and adopt the
Restatement rule as written.
763 P.2d at 785.
Plaintiff has not stated a cause of action for negligent
infliction of emotional distress because he was not in the zone
of danger.

5

CONCLUSION

Defendants1 petition for rehearing should be granted.

The

court should rule whether plaintiff has stated a cause of action
under the zone-of-da^g^r test.
DATED this

/ Lf

day of August, 1989.
MORGAN Jfe HANSEN

Hansen
John Clyde Hansen
Attorneys for DefendantsRespondents

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the
regoing were
wer mailed to the following, postage prepaid, this
fore^^^ng
' /

d

^y oJ)f August, 1989.

Jackson Howard,
Fred D. Howard,
Leslie W. Slaugh
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
120 East 300 North
P.O. Box 778
Provo, Utah 84603
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APPENDIX
Memorandum Decision
Johnson v. Roaers
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 313 (1965)

RECEIVED
AUG0 3 1989
MORGAN & HANSEN

F!L
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

AUG* 1289
*"T Noorwn
of t* Court
Court of Appeals

00O00

Jesse Brown, by and through
his guardian ad litem,
Jeffery Brown,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Publication)

Plaintiff and Appellant,
Case No. 890288-CA

v.
Kevin K. Loh, Joseph Pluta,
Norman Liawanag, Eugene
Long, and Thomas M. Foley,
dba The Knight Block
Partnership, a Hawaii
General Partnership,
Defendants and Respondents.

Before Judges Jackson, Garff, and Orme.
PER CURIAM:
This is an appeal from the trial court's grant of
defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's cause of action for
negligent infliction of emotional distress• The trial court
granted the motion to dismiss based on Reiser v. Lohner, 641
P.2d 93 (Utah 1982), which states that in Utah a cause of
action for emotional distress may not be based upon mere
negligence. After the briefs were filed in this case, the Utah
Supreme Court held that a cause of action for negligent
infliction of emotional distress exists in Utah. Johnson v.
Rogers, 763 P.2d 771 (Utah 1988). According to Johnson, the
test for determining liability for negligent infliction of
emotional distress is set forth in section 313 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965), as explained in the
comments accompanying that section. Id. (Zimmerman, J.,
concurring). We, therefore, reverse the trial court's grant of

the motion to dismiss and remand for proceedings in accordance
with Johnson•

ALL CONCUR:

880268-CA

2

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 2nd day of August, 1989, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum Decision was mailed to each
of the following:
Jackson Howard
Fred D. Howard
Leslie W. Slaugh
Attorneys for Appellant
120 East 300 North
PC Box 778
Provo, Utah
84603
Ray Phillips Ivie
Attorney for Respondents
48 North University Avenue
PO Box 672
Provo, Utah
84603
Darwin C. Hansen
Attorney for Respondent, Knight Block Partnership
Kearns Building, Eighth Floor
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
HON. Boyd L. Park
Fourth District Court
Utah County
Civil No. CV 87-37

Julia C. Whitfield
Deputy Clerk
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Cottonwood Hospital, the hospital which
treated Lynn for his 1974 heart attack.
The tests Lynn undertook as part of completing the application revealed that Lynn
had a first degree AV block.
Finally, if Lynn's statement to Rigby
that he had a heart attack in 1974 is imputed to Prudential, then it stands to reason
that Prudential had actual knowledge of
the very fact of which it now complains.
After Lynn died, Prudential quickly discovered his 1974 heart attack by following-up
on leads gleaned from his application.
Indeed, Prudential has conceded on previous occasions that it could not rescind a
policy based upon misrepresentations in the
application because it failed to procure
medical information after possessing leads.
For example, in Claim No. NOD085449,
Prudential paid the claim despite a misrepresentation because of its admitted failure
to procure available medical records:
Underwriter's comment on reverse of
Part I indicates that there was a basis
for requesting an [attending physician's
statement], but he opted not to. Thus
we waived the APS and accepted the risk
with our eyes open.
Similarly, in Claim No. NOD082820, the
insured failed to disclose an extensive history of heart disease but did disclose the
name of two medical centers where he had
been treated. Prudential paid the claim
notwithstanding the misrepresentation:
[B]ecause it was decided at issue to
waive a Special Class 3 rating based on
the insured's cardiac abnormalities you
are recommending that we pay the claim.
I agree. As I see it, there is no basis for
a misrepresentation defense. At underwriting time we were on notice
Underwriting . . . did not pursue obtaining
his medical records.
Whether the "cumulative effect" of the
information Prudential possessed, particularly in light of its above-discussed practice, was sufficient to put Prudential on
notice to conduct further inquiry into
Lynn's past medical conditions, which, if
done reasonably, would have led it to discover the conditions and treatments on
which it bases its rescission argument, po-

ses a genuine issue of material fact that
cannot, in our view, be decided as a matter
of law. See Trawick v. Manhattan Life
Ins. Co., 447 F.2d 1293, 1296 (5th Cir.1971).
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
HALL, C.J., HOWE, Associate CJ.,
and STEWART and DURHAM, JJ.,
concur.
ZIMMERMAN, J., having disqualified
himself, does not participate herein;
BILLINGS, Court of Appeals Judge,
sat.

| KEY NUMBER SYSTEM

«>

Ray C. JOHNSON and Frances C.
Johnson, Plaintiffs, Appellants,
and Cross-Appellees,
v.

Donald ROGERS and Newspaper Agency
Corporation, a Utah corporation^ Defendants, Appellees, and Cross-Appellants.
No. 20622.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Aug. 25, 1988.
Parents sued employer and driver employee for wrongful death of their child,
emotional distress to themselves, physical
injury to father, and also sought punitive
damages against both defendants. The
Third District Court, Salt Lake County,
Philip R. Fishier, granted defendants' motions for summary judgment on claims for
punitive damages, but denied defendants'
motion on issue of damages for father's
emotional distress, and cross appeals were
taken. The Supreme Court, Durham and
Zimmerman, JJ., held that: (1) punitive
damages are recoverable in drunk driver
cases where plaintiff shows that defendant
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acted with actual malice or reckless disregard of the rights of others and that his
drunken driving contributed to the accident; (2) question of whether driver's behavior justified award of punitive damages
was for jury; and (3) the "complicity rule"
governed issue of vicarious punitive damages; and in a concurring opinion, Zimmerman, J., held that (4) it could not be determined from the record whether there was
sufficient evidence to go to jury on question of employer's vicarious liability for
punitive damages; and (5) plaintiff seeking
recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress was required to be in "zone of
danger".
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded.
Zimmerman, J., concurred in part and
filed opinion, jomed by Hall, C.J., Howe,
Associate C.J., and Stewart, J.
1. Damages <^>91(1)
Punitive damages are not prohibited
where a tort-feasor has been convicted and
sentenced for criminal violations stemming
from his tortious conduct.
2. Damages <3=>91(1)
In order to recover punitive damages
in a drunk-driving case, plaintiff must show
that defendant acted with actual malice or
reckless disregard of rights of others and
that his drunken driving contributed to the
accident.
3. Judgment <s=>181(33)
Question of whether drunk driver's defendant's behavior was extreme, outrageous and shocking enough to warrant
punitive damages, in action for wrongful
death against drunken truck driver, was
for jury, precluding summary judgment for
driver.
4. Master and Servant <s=»331
Principal and Agent <^159(1)
Punitive damages can properly be
awarded against a principal because of an
act by an agent if the principal authorized
the doing and the manner of the act, or the
agent was unfit and the principal was reckless in employing or retaining him, or the

agent was employed in a managerial capacity and was acting in the scope of employment, or the principal ratified or approved
the act.
Concurring Opinion
5. Appeal and Error <3=1177(9)
It could not be determined from the
record whether there was sufficient evidence to go to the jury on question of
whether employer was reckless in employing or retaining drunk driver, as would
allow for an award of punitive damages
against employer; since trial court had operated under the assumption that employer
could not, under any circumstances, be held
liable for punitive damages, it was appropriate to remand case to trial court to permit parties to properly present the issue
and trial court to determine whether evidence was sufficient for jury.
6. Damages <3=»49.10
In order to recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress, plaintiff must
show that he was in the "zone of danger".
Gordon L. Roberts and Julia C. Attwood,
Salt Lake City, for Johnsons.
Edward J. McDonough and Lowell V.
Smith, Salt Lake City, for Newspaper
Agency Corp.
P. Keith Nelson, Salt Lake City, for Rogers.
DURHAM, Justice:
Plaintiffs sought compensatory damages
for the wrongful death of their child, as
well as for emotional distress to both plaintiffs and physical injury to plaintiff Ray
Johnson. They also sought punitive damages against defendants. The punitive
damages claim against defendant Newspaper Agency Corporation (NAC) was based
on vicarious liability for Rogers' conduct as
well as on NAC's own conduct. The trial
court granted defendants' motions for summary judgment as to the claims for punitive damages, but denied defendants' motion on the issue of damages for Ray Johnson's emotional distress. Plaintiffs filed
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this interlocutory appeal, and defendants
cross-appealed. We affirm the trial court's
ruling as to the damages for emotional
distress, but reverse on the issues relating
to punitive damages.
On December 10, 1984, NAC moved for
partial summary judgment on the issue of
punitive damages. On March 22, 1985,
NAC filed a motion seeking dismissal or
partial summary judgment as to the claims
for emotional distress. On March 25, 1985,
the trial court issued its memorandum decision granting NAC's motion for summary
judgment as to punitive damages, relying
on this Court's decision in McFarland v.
Skaggs Companies, Inc., 678 P.2d 298
(Utah 1984). Finding that there was no
evidence of actual malice on the part of
NAC, the court granted partial summary
judgment against plaintiffs on their claims
for punitive damages against NAC. The
court also ruled that Utah does not recognize vicarious liability for punitive damages. On the basis of that ruling, defendant Rogers moved for partial summary
judgment as to his liability for both punitive damages and emotional distress. Although granting partial summary judgment with respect to Rogers' liability for
punitive damages, the court denied summary judgment on the father's emotional distress claim, holding that a parent who is in
the "zone of danger" may recover for the
trauma associated with seeing a child injured. The claim for emotional distress on
the part of plaintiff Frances Johnson was
denied, but that ruling is not appealed here.
I. Facts
At approximately 10:00 p.m. on April 16,
1982, plaintiff Ray Johnson and his eightyear-old son David were waiting for a
"walk" signal before crossing a street in
downtown Salt Lake City. A truck crossed
the intersection and jumped the curb, killing David and injuring Ray. The truck
was owned by NAC and operated by Donald Rogers. It is admitted that Rogers
was driving under the influence of alcohol
and that he negligently caused the injuries.
Rogers began working for NAC in May,
1980. Rogers' license had previously been

revoked in Oregon after a conviction for
driving under the influence; NAC failed to
discover this fact. Rogers and other NAC
employees sometimes reported to work intoxicated. Although NAC had written
rules forbidding driving while intoxicated,
it apparently did not enforce these rules.
Rogers had been a heavy drinker for approximately six months to a year prior to
the accident. Depositions of NAC employees indicate that the use of alcohol and
marijuana was widespread and that no effort was made to curtail such use. These
depositions also indicate that NAC vehicles
were sometimes returned with beer cans in
them, and on one occasion, an NAC supervisor who observed drivers smoking marijuana told the drivers to "do it on the
road." Moreover, many deponents contended that these abuses were widely
known and that NAC management either
knew of these practices or could easily
have found out about them.
II. Standard for the Imposition of Punitive Damages
The trial court held in this case that "evilintent," "actual malice," or "malice in fact"
is required for the imposition of punitive
damages. That holding misconstrues our
case law; it was made in reliance on language in McFarland v. Skaggs Companies, Inc., 678 P.2d 298 (Utah 1984), iu
which this Court, after extensive consideration of specific policy concerns, established
an "actual malice" standard for the imposition of punitive damages in false imprisonment cases. The opinion itself, as well as
the law review article quoted extensively
therein, focuses solely on the "ancient tort
of false imprisonment [which creates] liability for wrongfully restraining another's
freedom of movement" and concludes that
an actual malice standard is necessary to
balance the competing interests in shoplifting cases.
The very real problem of shoplifting
pits two important considerations against
each other—the right of the merchant to
protect his inventory and the right of the
citizen to be free from unwarranted detention and accusation
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[B]y sanctioning unrestricted punitive
damages for a good faith mistake, the
Terry [v. Z.C.M.L, 605 P.2d 314 (Utah
1979) ] court tipped the balance too far in
favor of the patron and against the merchant
[The actual malice rule] protects the interests of both merchant and
patron without opening the door to unwarranted punitive damage recoveries.
McFarland v. Skaggs Companies, Inc.,
678 P.2d at 304 (quoting Note, False Imprisonment—Punitive Damages May Be
Awarded As A Matter of Law, 1980 Utah
L.Rev. 694, 699-700 (1980)).
McFarland departed from the Terry
"malice in law" standard only for false
imprisonment cases and only because of
carefully detailed policy reasons related to
that tort. Since McFarland, this Court has
explicitly articulated a broader standard
for the imposition of punitive damages in at
least two cases: Atkin Wright & Miles v.
Mountain States Telephone, 709 P.2d 330
(Utah 1985) (intentional interference with
prospective economic relations), and Synergetics v. Marathon Ranching Co., 701 P.2d
1106 (Utah 1985) (fraud, misrepresentation,
and deceit). We stated: "Punitive damages, among other things, punish conduct
which manifests a knowing or reckless* indifference toward, and disregard of, the
rights of others." Synergetics, 701 P.2d at
1112-13 (citations omitted). "Before punitive damages may be awarded, the plaintiff
must prove conduct that is willful and malicious . . . or that manifests a knowing and
reckless disregard toward the rights of others." Atkin Wright & Miles, 709 P.2d at
337 (citations omitted). In both of those
cases, we cited with approval identical or
1. Fritz v. Salvo, 406 So.2d 884 (Ala.1981); Smith
v. Chapman, 115 Ariz. 211, 564 P.2d 900 (1977)
(citing Ross v. Clark, 35 Ariz. 60, 274 P. 639
(1929)); Miller v. Blanton, 213 Ark. 246, 210
S.W.2d 293 (1948); Taylor v. Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, 24 Cal.3d 890, 598 P.2d 854,
157 CaLRptr. 693 (1979); Infeld v. Sullivan, 151
Conn. 506, 199 A.2d 693 (1964); Walczak v.
Healy, 280 A.2d 728 (Del.1971); Ingram v. Pettit,
340 So.2d 922 (Fla.1976); Chitwood v. Stoner,
60 Ga.App. 599, 4 S.E.2d 605 (Ga.Ct.App.1939);
Madison v. Wigal, 18 Ill.App.2d 564, 153 N.E.2d
90 (Ill.App.Ct.1958); Nichols v. Hocke, 297 N.W.
2d 205 (Iowa 1980) (citing Sebastian v. Wood,
246 Iowa 94, 66 N.W.2d 841 (1954)); WiggingtonsAdm'r v. Rickert, 186 Ky. 650, 217 S.W. 933

similar language from cases decided prior
to McFarland: Behrens v. Raleigh Hills
Hospital, Inc., 675 P.2d 1179 (Utah 1983)
(cited in Synergetics); Branch v. Western
Petroleum, Inc., 657 P.2d 267 (Utah 1982);
First Security Bank v. J.B.J. Feedyards,
Inc., 653 P.2d 591 (Utah 1982) (cited hi
Synergetics and Atkin Wright & Miles);
Terry v. Z.C.M.L, 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979)
(cited in Atkin Wright & Miles). The citation of the Terry standard in Atkin Wright
& Miles is significant because it conclusively demonstrates that McFarland overruled
the use of the Terry standard only for
false imprisonment cases, contrary to the
argument made in this case by the defendants.
The standard for punitive damages in
non-false imprisonment cases is thus clean
they may be imposed for conduct that is
willful and malicious or that manifests a
knowing and reckless indifference and disregard toward the rights of others. Defendants argue that mere driving under the
influence of alcohol is insufficient to support a finding of knowing and reckless
indifference and disregard for the rights
and safety of others, and Rogers further
argues that punitive damages are inappropriate here because he was convicted and
sentenced for criminal violations stemming
from the same acts.
The overwhelming majority of jurisdictions which have considered the issue have
ruled that punitive damages are available
in drunk driving cases.1
One who willfully consumes alcoholic
beverages to the point of intoxication,
(1920); Hawkinson v. Geyer, 352 N.W.2d 784
(Minn.App.1984); Southland Broadcasting Co. v.
Tracy, 210 Miss. 836, 50 So.2d 572 (1951);
Smith v. Sayles, 637 S.W.2d 714 (Mo.Ct.App.
1982); Allers v. Willis, 197 Mont. 499, 643 P.2d
592 (1982); Svejcara v. Whitman, 82 N.M. 739,
487 P.2d 167 (N.M.Ct.App.1971); Colligan v.
Fera, 76 Misc.2d 22, 349 N.Y.S.2d 306 (N.Y.Civ.
Ct.1973); Huff v. Chrismon, 68 N.CApp. 525,
315 S.E.2d 711 (N.C.Ct.App.), review denied, 311
N.C. 756, 321 N.E.2d 134 (1984); Harrell v.
Ames, 265 Or. 183, 508 P.2d 211 (1973); Pratt v.
Duck, 28 Tenn.App. 502, 191 S.W.2d 562 (1945);
Crider v. Appelt, 696 S.W.2d 55 (Tex.Ct.App.
1985).
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knowing that he thereafter must operate
a motor vehicle, thereby combining
sharply impaired physical and mental
faculties with a vehicle capable of great
force and speed, reasonably may be held
to exhibit a conscious disregard for the
safety of others.
The allowance of punitive damages in
such cases may well be appropriate because of another reason, namely to deter
similar future conduct— [T]he applicable principle was well expressed in a
recent Oregon case
[T]he fact of common knowledge that
the drinking driver is the cause of so
many of the more serious automobile
accidents is strong evidence in itself to
support the need for all possible means
of deterring persons from driving automobiles after drinking, including exposure to awards of punitive damages in
the event of accidents.
Taylor v. Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, 24 Cal.3d 890, 897, 598 P.2d 854,
857, 157 CaLRptr. 693, 697 (1979) (quoting
Harrell v. Ames, 265 Or. 183, 190, 508 P.2d
211, 214-15 (1973)).
[1] Assessing punitive damages in
cases such as this is not inappropriate or
inconsistent with the deterrence function, of
damages. See Peterson v. Superior Court
of Ventura County, 31 Cal.3d 147, 154-62,
642 P.2d 1305, 1308-13, 181 CaLRptr. 784,
787-92 (1982); Soria v. Sierra Pac. Airlines, 111 Idaho 594, 610, 726 P.2d 706, 722
(1986); Sebastian v. Wood, 246 Iowa 94,
100, 66 N.W.2d 841, 844 (1954); Dorn v.
Wilmarth, 254 Or. 236, 239-40, 458 P.2d
942, 944 (1969); Ellis, Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages,
56 S.Cal.L.Rev. 1 (1982); Schwartz, Deterrence and Punishment in the Common
Law of Punitive Damages: A Comment,
56 S.Cal.L.Rev. 133 (1982). Given their deterrence value, punitive damages are not
prohibited where a tort-feasor has been
convicted and sentenced for criminal violations stemming from his tortious conduct
In Huffv. Chrismon, 68 N.CApp. 525, 315
S.E.2d 711, review denied, 311 N.C. 756,
321 S.E.2d 134 (1984), the North Carolina

Court of Appeals stated that the assessment of punitive damages in civil cases,
separate from any criminal penalties imposed, was "consistent with the trend to
maximize punishment and deterrence of impaired drivers
" 68 N.CApp. at 532,
315 S.E.2d at 715. On the specific question
of deterrence, the Oregon Supreme Court
went on to observe:
It may be debatable whether either
awards of punitive damages or the imposition of criminal penalties will effectively deter persons from driving after drinking. However, in the absence of a showing of substantial evidence to the contrary, we are not prepared to hold that
law enforcement officials and courts,
who have a heavy responsibility in this
area, are wrong in their present apparent
assumption that both criminal penalties
and awards of punitive damages may
have at least some deterrent effect in.
dealing with this serious problem. We
are also not aware of any good reasons
why punitive damages should not have
as much deterrent effect upon this type
of wanton and reckless conduct as upon
other types of conduct in which awards
of punitive damages are traditionally approved by the courts.
Harrell v. Ames, 265 Or. at 190-91, 508
P.2d at 215 (citations omitted; emphasis
added).
[2] In this state, the Utah Court of Appeals has held that punitive damages are
available in drunk driving cases. In Biswell v. Duncan, 742 P.2d 80 (Utah CtApp.
1987), the court determined that punitive
damages may be awarded upon proof of
either actual or legal malice and that the
imposition of punitive damages against
drunk drivers is consistent with Utah's
public policy. Id. at 84. The court held
that in order to recover, a plaintiff must
show that the defendant acted with actual
malice or a reckless disregard of the rights
of others and that his drunken driving contributed to the accident. Id.
We agree with the majority of other jurisdictions and with the Utah Court of Appeals. We see no reason to exclude drunk
driving from the categories of outrageous
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conduct, either willful or knowingly reckless, which are eligible for the imposition of
punitive damages. We emphasize that this
is not a "per se" rule: the mere allegation
or fact of having caused an accident or
injury after drinking and driving will not
support an award of punitive damages.
The standard is fact-specific and requires
proof of conduct which is knowingly reckless and exhibits a high degree of disregard for the safety of others. To that
extent, defendants are correct when they
argue that mere allegations of driving after drinking could not support a punitive
damages award.
[3] In this case, however, we have allegations, evidence, and admissions of far
more outrageous behavior. Rogers was
employed as a truck driver. During the
period of time immediately before reporting to work on the evening of the accident,
he had consumed approximately seven
mixed drinks containing vodka and had
"chug-a-lugged" a 27-ounce drink containing two mini-bottles of tequila. His blood
alcohol content after the accident was .18
percent. He admitted that he had been a
"heavy" or "problem" drinker for six
months to a year prior to the accident and
that he had been convicted of driving under
the influence in Oregon. At 10:00 p.m.,
Rogers drove his truck across an intersection in downtown Salt Lake City, up over
the curb and onto the sidewalk, hitting and
throwing several concrete pillars and the
eight-year-old victim who had been standing on the corner.
The foregoing facts, if proved to a jury,
would certainly be sufficient to support a
finding of knowing and reckless disregard
for the safety of others. Defendants suggest that because Rogers was probably too
drunk to know or control what he was
doing, he cannot be found to have been
"knowingly" reckless. It would be perfectly permissible for a jury, however, to find
that the element of deliberation and knowledge in his behavior comes from his con2. Plaisance v. Yelder, 408 So.2d 136 (Ala.Civ.
App.1981); Echols v. Beauty Built Homes, Inc.,
132 Ariz. 498, 647 P.2d 629 (1982); Rickman v.
Safeway Stores, 124 Mont. 451, 227 P.2d 607
(1951); Kurrt v. Radencic, 193 Okl. 126, 141 P.2d

sumption of large amounts of alcohol just
before reporting to work and his decision
to get into his truck and drive it on the
public streets. It would be anomalous if a
sober driver who drives a vehicle onto a
sidewalk with people on it could be held
liable for punitive damages (which would
certainly be possible in the appropriate factual context), while one who has deliberately rendered himself incapable of driving
safely and then drives could not. On the
other hand, mere drinking and driving, absent evidence that the manner of doing so
reflects conscious disregard for the safety
of others, would not qualify for punitive
damages. Cf Baker v. Marcus, 201 Va.
905, 114 S.E.2d 617 (1960). As with punitive damages in all personal injury cases, it
is the extreme, outrageous, and shocking
behavior that justifies their imposition in
drunk driving cases. The behavior alleged
in this case is sufficiently extreme, outrageous, and shocking to permit the issue
to go to the jury. Therefore, we hold that
the trial court erred in granting summary
judgment on the availability of punitive
damages and reverse on that issue.
III.

Vicarious Liability of Employer for
Punitive Damages
The issue of when an employer can be
held vicariously liable for punitive damages
because of the acts of nonmanagerial employees is one of first impression in Utah.
There are currently at least four approaches to such liability in other jurisdictions. The first is a straight-forward vicarious liability rule that permits recovery
against an employer whenever the employer is liable for the same conduct in compensatory damages.2
A second, more conservative approach
has been adopted by a number of other
jurisdictions. See J. Ghiardi & J. Kircher,
Punitive Damages Law and Practice, ch.
24, at 4-5 (1987), and cases cited therein.
This standard appears in the Restatement
580 (1943); Stroud v. Denny's Restaurant, Inc.,
271 Or. 430, 532 P.2d 790 (1975); Delahanty v.
First Pennsylvania Bank, N.A., 318 Pa.Super. 90,
464 A.2d 1243 (1983).
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(Second) of Torts § 909 and the Restatement (Second) of Agency § 217C:
Punitive damages can properly be awarded against a master or other principal
because of an act by an agent if, but only
if,
(a) the principal or a managerial agent
authorized the doing and the manner of
the act, or
(b) the agent was unfit and the principal or a managerial agent was reckless in
employing or retaining him, or
(c) the agent was employed in a managerial capacity and was acting in the
scope of employment, or
(d) the principal or a managerial agent
of the principal ratified or approved the
act.
The third standard takes an intermediate
approach between pure vicarious liability
and the Restatement standard, which is not
"true" vicarious liability because it is predicated on acts of the principal. This standard has been adopted by the Supreme
Court of Florida and the United States
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and is characterized by the parties as a "some fault"
rule:
Before an employer may be held vicariously liable for punitive damages under
the doctrine of respondeat superior,
there must be some fault on his part.
Although the misconduct of the employee, upon which the vicarious liability of
the employer for punitive damages is
based, must be willful and wanton, it is
not necessary that the fault of the employer, independent of his employee's
conduct, also be willful and wanton. It
is sufficient that the plaintiff allege and
prove some fault on the part of the employer which foreseeably contributed to
the plaintiffs injury to make him vicariously liable for punitive damages.
Mercury Motors Express, Inc. v. Smith,
393 So.2d 545, 549 (Fla.1981); see also Dorsey v. Honda Motor Co., 670 F.2d 21 (5th
Cir.1982).
Finally, there are four states which apparently prohibit "vicarious" punitive damages altogether. See Briner v. Hyslop,

337 N.W.2d 858, 864-65 (Iowa 1983), and
cases cited therein.
The courts of other jurisdictions are
nearly evenly divided over the proper basis
for "vicarious" punitive damage liability.
See J. Ghiardi & J. Kirchner, Punitive
Damages Law and Practice, ch. 24, at
36-39 (1987) (twenty-one states follow traditional respondeat superior rules, and
nineteen follow the "complicity rule" embodied in the Restatement).
There are serious arguments in support
of the position that "vicarious" punitive
damages ought to be abandoned entirely as
inefficient and unfair. One recent treatment of the subject reached the following
conclusion:
In summary, vicarious punitive damage liability cannot be justified as deserved punishment. Indeed, it is usually
conceded to be unfair. Deterrence alone
is thus relied on to justify it. The foregoing analysis indicates, however, that
efficient levels of deterrence are unlikely
to be promoted by vicarious punitive
damage liability, even assuming that the
criteria for assessing punitive damages
can be made certain and predictable.
When that assumption is dropped, it becomes apparent that the combination of
vicarious liability with the prevailing uncertain criteria for determining liability
and magnitude serves to diminish rather
than to increase aggregate welfare.
Ellis, Fairness and Efficiency in the Law
of Punitive Damages, 56 S.Cal.L.Rev. 1, 71
(1982).
In an article in the same symposium,
another scholar suggests that closer attention should be paid to the differential
analysis required by punishment versus deterrence as goals and disagrees with Professor Ellis on vicarious punitive damages;
Consider now the problem of vicarious
liability for punitive damages. As a gen*
eral matter, our existing criminal law
regards vicarious liability as an impermissible basis for punishment (except,
perhaps, for a limited range of minor
penalty regulatory offenses): one man
cannot be judged morally guilty on account of another man's crime. By con-
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trast, our civil law of torts warmly embraces vicarious liability, apparently because the employer is in the best position
to control the behavior of his own employees. If punishment is the chief purpose of punitive damages, then the criminal law model should prevail and vicarious liability should be rejected. But if
deterrence is the principle purpose, the
tort law model seems controlling, and
vicarious liability can be endorsed.
Schwartz, Deterrence and Punishment in
The Common Law of Punitive Damages:
A Comment, 56 S.Cal.L.Rev. 133, 136
(1982).
[4] The defendants in this case have
not, however, argued the legitimacy of vicarious punitive damages; they have addressed only the standard for imposition.
We are therefore not inclined to address
the fundamental question at this time, but
we are sufficiently concerned about the
rationale supporting the doctrine to opt for
the more conservative standard articulated
by the Restatement rule. The "complicity
rule" (a term apparently coined by Morris,
Punitive Damages in Personal Injury
Cases, 21 Ohio StLJ. 216, 221 (1969)), Urnits vicarious punitive damages to those situations where wrongful acts were committed or specifically authorized by a managerial agent or were committed by an unfit
employee who was recklessly employed or
retained. Since the rule requires some
wrongful action on the part of the employer, it addresses at least some of the punishment and deterrence goals accepted thus
far in the law of this state.

effort to hide his drinking habits and that
they were apparent in the workplace; Rogers frequently came to work intoxicated,
openly consumed alcohol while he was at
work, and periodically took alcohol with
him in company vehicles when he made
deliveries; alcohol and drug use were relatively common during working hours and in
company vehicles and that NAC supervisors not only were aware of such use, but
were also participants on occasion; alcohol
and drug use at work was common, open,
and the subject of regular "office gossip";
there was virtually no supervision of employees on the night shift, and no vehicle
check-out system; and NAC policies
against drug and alcohol use were not enforced.
I note, of course, that many or all of the
above facts may be disputed by NAC, but
on a motion for summary judgment, we
should determine whether the prevailing
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law on a view of the proffered facts most
favorable to the losing party. Based on
the brief summary detailed above, I conclude that plaintiffs are entitled to a jury
verdict on the question of whether NAC
"authorized the doing and the manner of
the act" of taking out company vehicles on
company business while in a state of extreme intoxication or whether "the agent
was unfit and the principal or a managerial
agent was reckless in employing or retaining him." Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 909(a), (b) (1965). Therefore, I would
reverse the summary judgment on the issue of punitive damages against NAC and
remand for trial.

The issue thus becomes whether there
exist triable issues of fact regarding NAC's
liability for punitive damages under the
Restatement standard. In addition to the
facts described earlier in this opinion, the
following facts involving NAC were the
subject of testimony or other evidence during discovery: although NAC purportedly
ran periodic driver's license checks on its
drivers, it failed to learn of Rogers' previous conviction and also failed to learn that
two other drivers drove on suspended licenses while in NAC employ; Rogers and
other employees testified that he made no

IV. Negligent Infliction of Emotional
Distress
Also before us on appeal is the question
of whether a cause of action for negligently inflicted emotional distress exists in
Utah and, if so, under what circumstances
it exists. Defendants rely on Reiser v.
Lohner, 641 P.2d 93 (Utah 1982), and
Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289, 358 P.2d
344 (1961). In Reiser, the Court rejected
without analysis a claim for emotional distress to the parents of a child damaged by
allegedly negligent medical treatment
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The opinion says, "[I]t is well established in
Utah that a cause of action for emotional
distress may not be based upon mere negligence." The two cases relied on for that
principle are Samms v. Eccles and Jeppsen
v. Jensen, 47 Utah 536, 155 P. 429 (1916).
In Samms v. Eccles, addressing a claim
for emotional distress resulting from ''indecent proposals," the Court held:
Our study of the authorities, and of the
arguments advanced, convinces us that,
conceding such a cause of action may not
be based upon mere negligence, the best
considered view recognizes an action for
severe emotional distress, though not accompanied by bodily impact or physical
injury, where the defendant intentionally
engaged in some conduct toward the
plaintiff, (a) with the purpose of inflicting emotional distress, or, (b) where any
reasonable person would have known
that such would result; and that his actions are of such a nature as to be considered outrageous and intolerable in
that they offend against the generally
accepted standards of decency and morality.
11 Utah 2d at 293, 358 P.2d at 346-47
(citations omitted).
Jeppsen v. Jensen, although containing
some dicta suggesting that the Court accepted the then-prevailing majority view
that no recovery could be had for negligent
infliction of emotional distress, does not so
hold; the Court merely determined that a
complaint alleging emotional distress as a
result of "willful and wanton" acts stated a
cause of action.
While it is true, and that it is so is not
remarkable, that there are some cases
which seem to hold that in no case can a
recovery be had where the injuries are
caused alone from fright, yet it is also
true that there are many cases which
seem to hold that a recovery may be had
for fright alone, although the acts complained of constituted merely negligent
acts. Such cases are, however, not numerous, and the great weight of authority is reflected in [the cases to the contrary cited above].

Jeppsen v. Jensen, 47 Utah at 543, 155 P.
at 431.
In view of the age of Samms v. Eccles
(decided twenty-seven years ago) and
Jeppsen v. Jensen (decided seventy-two
years ago), a reexamination of their premises is timely. This is particularly so in view
of the extensive development of the law in
this area in the intervening period and the
abandonment by other jurisdictions of the
precedents which were persuasive to this
Court in its earlier opinions. Therefore, we
depart from the approach taken in Reiser
v. Lohner and address the question anew:
Should a cause of action exist in this jurisdiction for the negligent infliction of emotional distress, and should the cause of
action extend to bystanders whose emotional injuries result from the infliction of injury to or death of third persons? We note
that all parties have framed the issue in
this fashion. It is unclear from the record
whether Rogers' conduct is claimed to be
sufficiently "wanton" to qualify under the
intentional infliction of emotional distress,
standard.
Virtually all jurisdictions in the United
States now recognize a broad protected interest in mental tranquility, first acknowledged in Utah in Jeppsen. The negligent
infliction of emotional distress as a separate tort (distinct from the "willful and
wanton" infliction of emotional distress or
the negligent infliction of physical injuries
with concomitant emotional injuries) has
evolved rapidly only since the 1960s. See
W. Keeton, D. Dobbs & D. Owen, Prosser
and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 54 (5th
ed. 1984); Note, The Negligent Infliction
of Emotional Distress: A Critical Analysis of Various Approaches to the Tort in
Light of Ochoa v. Superior Court, 19 Ind.
L.Rev. 809 (1986). A common fact pattern
for the cause of action is that existing in
this case: a bystander observes negligent
injury to a victim, which causes the bystander to suffer emotional distress. The
courts have developed several rules affecting recovery for the emotional distress.
Currently, no jurisdiction precludes recovery under any circumstances. Recovery is
based upon satisfaction of one of three
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standards: the impact rule, the zone-ofdanger rule, or a foreseeability standard.
The impact rule requires that a plaintiff
sustain some physical impact or injury
which itself causes emotional distress. It
was the original and most limited approach
to emotional distress claims and was responsive to courts' early concerns about
speculative damages and floods of litigation over trivial claims. Although this rule
was at one time a majority position, it has
fallen into disfavor in recent years for a
number of reasons. Suspicion regarding
the authenticity of claims of mental distress has decreased with medical advances
in the field of psychiatry and psychology.
The concern over case load impact has
come to be seen as inadequate reason to
deny legitimate claims, and those courts
that have abandoned the impact rule have
not in fact seen drastic increases in this
type of litigation. Finally, the results of
the impact rule were often arbitrary, capricious, and unfair: the existence of a physical impact or injury frequently bore no
rational relationship to the existence and
severity of emotional injuries. Sometimes
even the slightest of physical impacts (e.g.,
from smoke, dust, small jolts) was a sufficient predicate for recovery for emotional
injuries, whereas the absence of such trivial impact could preclude recovery for the
same injuries. See Note, The Negligent
Infliction of Emotional Distress: A Critical Analysis of Various Approaches to
the Tort in Light of Ochoa v. Superior
Court, 19 Ind.L.Rev. 809 (1986). Because
of its irrationality, the majority of courts
abandoned the impact rule.
The zone-of-danger rule, relied on by the
trial judge in this case, was adopted by
many courts as a less restrictive substitute
for the impact rule. It is set forth in
section 313 of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts:
(1) If the actor unintentionally causes
emotional distress to another, he is subject to liability to the other for resulting
illness or bodily harm if the actor
(a) should have realized that his conduct involved an unreasonable risk of
causing the distress, otherwise than by

knowledge of the harm or penl of a third
person, and (b) from facts known to him,
should have realized that the distress, if
it were caused, might result in illness or
bodily harm.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) has
no application to illness or bodily harm of
another which is caused by emotional
distress arising solely from harm or penl
to a third person, unless the negligence
of the actor has otherwise created an
unreasonable risk of bodily harm to the
other.
(Emphasis added.)
The zone-of-danger rule offers many of
the same benefits, although more expansive in its application, as did the impact
rule. It is an objective standard and serves
to identify in consistent fashion those who
are eligible to recover. Unfortunately, it
also suffers from many of the disadvantages of the impact rule: it is a rigid and
inequitable limitation on recovery for injuries which are otherwise indistinguishable
from each other. The parent standing next
to the child hit by a car has a cause of
action; the parent standing twenty feet
away does not.
California was the first jurisdiction in the
United States to extend liability beyond the
zone of danger. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal.2d
728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal.Rptr. 72 (1968).
In Dillon, Justice Tobriner of the California Supreme Court wrote:
[T]he complaint here presents the claim
of the emotionally traumatized mother,
who admittedly was not within the zone
of danger, as contrasted with that of the
sister, who may have been within it.
The case thus illustrates the fallacy of
the rule that would deny recovery in the
one situation and grant it in the other.
In the first place, we can hardly justify
relief to the sister for trauma which she
suffered upon apprehension of the child's
death and yet deny it to the mother
merely because of a happenstance that
the sister was some few yards closer to
the accident. The instant case exposes
the hopeless artificiality of the zone-ofdanger rule. In the second place, to rest
upon the zone-of-danger rule when we
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have rejected the impact rule becomes
even less defensible. We have, indeed,
held that impact is not necessary for
recovery. The zone-of-danger concept
must, then, inevitably collapse because
the only reason for the requirement of
presence in that zone lies in the fact that
one within it will fear the danger of
impact
68 Cal.2d at 731, 441 P.2d at 915, 69 Cal.
Rptr. at 75 (citation omitted).
The court went on to observe that it had
in the past "rejected the argument that we
must deny recovery upon a legitimate claim
because other fraudulent ones may be
urged," 68 Cal.2d at 733, 441 P.2d at 917,
69 CaLRptr. at 77, and that "the alleged
inability to fix definitions on the different
facts of future cases does not justify the
denial of recovery on the specific facts of
the instant case; ... proper guidelines can
indicate the extent of liability for such future cases/' 68 Cal.2d at 735, 441 P.2d at
919, 69 CaLRptr. at 79. Focusing on the
foreseeability of risk, the court enunciated
what has come to be known as the "Dillon
rule," consisting of three factors which
when evaluated determine the degree of
foreseeability of the plaintiffs injury: (1)
whether the plaintiff was located near the
scene of the accident; (2) whether the emotional trauma to the plaintiff was caused
by actually witnessing the accident; and (3)
whether the plaintiff and the victim were
closely related. In light of these factors,
the court can determine whether the injury
was reasonably foreseeable. 68 Cal.2d at
736, 441 P.2d at 920-21, 69 Cal.Rptr. at 80.
Hawaii has broadened the Dillon foreseeability standard, using a "pure" foreseeability analysis in bystander cases. Where
serious emotional distress to a plaintiff-bystander is the reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendant's act, the defendant's conduct is the proximate cause of
the plaintiffs mental injury and general
3. This distinction, while easy to make in many
situations, is more difficult to make in cases
involving medical treatment and mistreatment.
Courts dealing with injury to or the death of a
fetus during labor or birth have struggled over
the classification of the pregnant woman as
either direct victim or bystander. The mental
injury is the result of a breach of the doctor's

tort principles are applied to impose liability. Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Haw. 398, 520
P.2d 758 (1974); Rodrigues v. State, 52
Haw. 156, 472 P.2d 509, reh'g denied, 52
Haw. 283, 472 P.2d 509 (1970). In the
absence of any limiting rules, however, the
circumstances permitting liability extend
far beyond ordinary expectations, creating
grave theoretical and policy problems.
The distinction between "direct victim"
and "bystander" liability and its effect on
the standard of recovery used by the
courts must also be examined in order for
the summary of currently accepted approaches to liability to be complete.
Courts have characterized the direct or primary victim as the person to whom a duty
was owed and who was directly injured by
the breach of that duty. The bystander or
secondary victim is anyone who was not
directly injured by the defendant, but who
suffered mental distress as a result of his
or her association with the direct victim's
injury. Thus, in fact situations involving
car/pedestrian accidents, the person who is
physically injured by the defendant may
bring an action for emotional trauma as a.
direct victim, while a bystander to the accident may recover based only on theories of
secondary liability.3
The direct victim/bystander distinction isimportant because in some jurisdictions it
controls the standard which a plaintiff
must meet in order to recover. In California, the Dillon standard no longer applies
in direct victim cases. Instead, the court
has adopted a broader foreseeability test
and has abandoned the requirement that
the emotional injury be physically manifested. Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hosp.,
27 Cal.3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 CaLRptr.
831 (1980). States that have adopted a
zone-of-danger rule have, in effect, limited
recovery to cases involving direct victims,
disallowing recovery to bystanders. Plainduty to the pregnant woman directly and also of
her witnessing the injuries to the fetus. The
pregnant mother may therefore fall under either the primary or the secondary victim classification. See, e.g., Sesma v. Cueto, 129 Cal-App.
3d 108, 181 CaLRptr. 12 (1982) (parents classified as both direct victims and bystanders).
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tiffs who are allowed to recover because
they were present within the zone of danger are direct victims because the defendant breached the duty of care owed them.
Other witnesses falling outside of the zone
are denied recovery due to the lack of
direct injury and breach of a duty. The
distinction between direct victims and bystanders must be taken into account in
fashioning and applying any standard of
recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress.
A final comment must be added to the
discussion of direct victim and bystander
liability. As a method by which a defendant's liability can be limited in bystander
cases, many jurisdictions require that any
claimed emotional injury be manifested
physically. This requirement persists in
most jurisdictions as a sign of courts' concern that emotional injury claims made by
plaintiffs who have not been directly injured are difficult to validate in the absence
of physical symptoms and that deletion of
this requirement would result in a flood of
ill-founded bystander claims. However,
some courts have recently dismissed these
concerns as unwarranted and now allow
recovery in the absence of any physical
symptoms. See, e.g., Rodrigues v. State,
52 Haw. 156, 472 P.2d 509, reh'g denied, 52
Haw. 283, 472 P.2d 509 (1970); Paugh v.
Hanks, 6 Ohio St.3d 72, 451 N.E.2d 759
(1983) (physical injury is evidence of the
degree of mental injury).
Our research has not disclosed, nor have
the parties identified, any jurisdiction in the
United States which bars all recovery for
the negligent infliction of emotional distress. The policy considerations in favor of
realistic limits on negligence liability have
given rise in turn to the impact rule, the
zone-of-danger rule, and the Dillon rule,
but not to a refusal to recognize the cause
of action under any circumstances. Although the search for coherent, consistent
application of liability principles in this area
is difficult, that difficulty is an inappropriate predicate for denial of redress to a
4. My analysis in the remaining portion of this
opinion has not been joined by a majority of the

whole class of legitimate and serious
claims.
It is further to be observed that the
argument against allowing such an action because groundless charges may be
made is not a good reason for denying
recovery. If the right to recover for
injury resulting from wrongful conduct
could be defeated whenever such dangers exist, many of the grievances the
law deals with would be eliminated.
That some claims may be spurious
should not compel justice to shut their
[sic] eyes to serious wrongs and let them
go without being brought to account. It
is the function of courts and juries to
determine whether claims are valid or
false. This responsibility should not be
shunned merely because the task may be
difficult to perform.
Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d at 293, 358
P.2d at 347.
We therefore sustain the trial judge in
his determination that a cause of action for
negligent infliction of emotional distress
may be maintained and undertake to establish general guidelines for the availability
of recovery. A discussion of the rule of
law to be applied must be general because
the facts of this case would satisfy any of
the three major tests applied in other jurisdictions. The plaintiff here suffered an
impact during the accident, receiving physical injuries to his foot. Furthermore, he
was in the immediate zone of danger created by Rogers' acts. Finally, all three of
the Dillon criteria are present: he was
located immediately at the scene of the
accident, he saw and heard all of the events
associated with the violence to the victim,
and the victim was his child.
I believe that the analytic approach of
the Dillon rule is fundamentally sound in
its focus on foreseeability as a necessary
element of duty in negligence cases, and I
would treat it as a legitimate starting point
in the treatment of bystander causes of
action for negligent infliction of emotional
distress.4 I am aware, however, that the
court.
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rule as formulated in Dillon has not served a general foreseeability analysis combined
as an adequate guarantee of certainty in with a "clear and convincing'' standard of
application even by the California courts.5 proof); Note, Negligent Infliction of EmoI therefore emphasize that it is impossi- tional Distress: Developments in the
ble to articulate a mechanistic test, as op- Law, 14 BaltL.Rev. 135 (1984) ("The best
posed to identifying an analytic approach, approach may be to treat negligent inflicin a case which challenges no traditional tion of emotional distress as any other neglimitations. In effect, I would hold that ligence action, employing the criteria of
one may recover for the negligent infliction foreseeability and proximate cause, keepof emotional distress when one was in the ing in of damages to be awarded."); Note,
zone of danger created by the negligence Limiting Liability for the Negligent Inand suffered a physical impact. I neverfliction of Emotional Distress: The "Bytheless express the view that the less arbistander Recoveryn Cases, 54 S.Cal.L.Rev.
trary, more traditional tort analysis embodied in the Dillon rule is appropriate. It is 847 (1981) (proposing that bystander recovtrue that Dillon is more flexible than the ery for the negligent infliction of emotional
impact and zone-of-danger rules, but it is distress be limited to "those types of emonot entirely free from the criticism that it tional distress for which a reasonable person would be emotionally unprepared")too has
The decisional law pertaining to neglibecome hardened and mechanical in pracgent infliction of emotional distress, partice because the courts attempting to apply [it] have no general policies to guide
ticularly bystander cases, illustrates
them in the difficult cases.
what may happen when unnecessarily
doctrinaire approaches, based on policy
If there is a rule which can determine
liability in a more policy-oriented and less
considerations, are substituted for tradiarbitrary manner while still drawing a
tional negligence criteria. The adoption
line short of unlimited liability, such a
of arbitrary standards such as the impact
rule should be adopted. A clear rule
and zone of danger rules were well-intenneeds a clear rationale.
tioned efforts at addressing fears of unNote, Limiting Liability for the Negligent
limited liability, but many deserving
Infliction of Emotional Distress: The
plaintiffs were left without a remedy....
"Bystander Recovery" Cases, 54 S.Cal.L.
Courts that have recognized this proposiRev. 847, 867 (1981).
tion have relaxed rigid rules, but the
The scholarly literature contains some
foreseeability standard that has been
interesting proposals for amelioration of
substituted in their stead has not been
the ambiguities unsolved by the Dillon
completely free of arbitrary criteria.
rule. See, e.g., Note, The Negligent InflicWhile certain factors, such as proximity
tion of Emotional Distress: A Critical
to and observance of the accident, relaAnalysis of Various Approaches to the
tionship to the victim, and physical sympTort in Light of Ochoa v. Superior Court,
toms, may be valuable indicia of the mer19 Ind.L.Rev. 809 (1986) (suggesting a
its
of a complaint, courts should not ap"flexible standard of liability" premised on
5. In Ochoa v. Superior Court, 39 Cal.3d 159, 703
P.2d 1, 216 Cal.Rptr. 661 (1985), the California
Supreme Court attempted to resolve some of the
uncertainty generated by California courts in
applying the Dillon factors. A seemingly inconsistent pattern of decisions based on the factors
stemmed from confusion surrounding the definitions of "contemporaneous" and "sensory observance of the accident." The court in Ochoa
examined whether recovery under Dillon was
limited to brief and sudden injury viewed contemporaneously by plaintiffs. The Ochoa court
ultimately decided that the "sudden occurrence"

requirement adopted by some courts was an
unnecessary restriction of Dillon. 39 Cal.3d at
168, 703 P.2d at 7, 216 Cal.Rptr. at 667. However, Ochoa has been criticized as further adding to the confusion in the application of the
Dillon factors by declining to clarify "contemporaneous" beyond the facts of the case and avoiding a definition of "sensory observance of the
accident." See Note, The Negligent Infliction of
Emotional Distress: A Critical Analysis of Various Approaches to the Tort in Light of Ochoa v.
Superior Court, 19 Ind.L.Rev. 809, 822-24
(1986).
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ply them so inflexibly as to preclude an
otherwise provable claim.
Note, Negligent Infliction of Emotional
Distress: Developments in the Law, 14
Balt.L.Rev. at 159.
Although I believe that expanding Utah's
tort principles to allow recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress is prudent, I also recognize that philosophical
concerns about the proper limits of tort
liability exist. While liability standards
have been greatly expanded in the past few
decades, the pendulum has recently begun
to swing back, with courts and commentators now reexamining the effectiveness and
cost of the current system. At least one
scholar believes that the focus should be on
standards that prevent accidents rather
than on compensation, a goal that is better
served by traditional insurance than by the
courts.6 It is possible that a major redesign of current tort law will become necessary and desirable. In the meantime, I am
satisfied that the limits on recovery for
negligent infliction of emotional distress
contained in the Dillon rule strike an appropriate balance between the need for
flexibility and the need for predictability.

Durham's opinion. I agree that punitive
damages may be recovered from drunk
drivers so long as the appropriate standard
of fault is met. I further agree with Justice Durham that the appropriate standard
of fault for the imposition of punitive damages against a drunk driver is knowing and
reckless disregard for the rights of others.
I think it important to emphasize that not
every case involving intoxicated driving
presents a jury question on punitive damages. See Miskin v. Carter, 761 P.2d 1378,
(Utah 1988). However, I agree that on
balance, there is sufficient evidence to go
to the jury on the question of whether
Rogers7 conduct satisfied the "knowing and
reckless" standard. The way he operated
the NAC truck, combined with his high
level of intoxication at the time of the
accident, the excessive drinking that occurred immediately before the accident,
and his history of drinking and operating a
motor vehicle, all provide sufficient evidence from which a jury could find that
punitive damages are warranted. See Miskin. Therefore, I join Justice Durham in
reversing the trial court's grant of partial
summary judgment on the question of Rogers' liability for punitive damages.

Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
Remanded for trial.

[4,5] My second area of concern relates
to the claim for punitive damages against
Rogers' employer, defendant NAC, which
is addressed in Part III of Justice Durham's opinion. I agree that an employer
may be liable for punitive damages as a
result of a tortious act of an employee, but
only so long as that liability is premised on
the conduct of the employer, and I join
Justice Durham in concluding that the appropriate standard for determining that liability is set forth in section 909 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts (1979). Applying that standard to this case, Justice
Durham would hold that the question of
NAC's liability should go to the jury. I do
not agree that we can determine from the
record before us whether there is sufficient

ZIMMERMAN, Justice (concurring in
part):
My view of this case differs somewhat
from that of Justice Durham. Since this is
a case of first impression in this Court on
an issue that is almost certain to come
before trial courts frequently, I write separately to express my distinct views and to
provide the trial courts, as well as the bar,
with additional guidance.1
[2,3] My first point of concern pertains
to the claim for punitive damages against
the driver of the van, defendant Rogers,
which is addressed in Part II of Justice
6. See Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and
Modem Tort Law, 96 Yale LJ. 1521 (1987)
(wherein the author concludes: "[T]he diffuse
and indiscriminate expansion of substantive tort
liability has led to the unraveling of insurance
markets in an increasing number of contexts.
This unraveling can be arrested only if substan-

tive standards of liability are redefined to focus
exclusively on the accident reduction goal." Id.
at 1589.).
1. Because three other Justices have joined in
this opinion, it represents the views of a majority of this Court on the issues it addresses.
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evidence to go to the jury on this question.
In arguing for the imposition of punitive
damages against NAC, the Johnsons seriously rely only on the test set forth in
section 909(b) of the Restatement, which
requires proof that "the agent was unfit
and the principal or a managerial agent
was reckless in employing or retaining him
[or her]." A careful examination of Justice
Durham's opinion reveals that while the
evidence there summarized is certainly sufficient to raise the question of whether
NAC was generally careless in how it supervised its employees, none of the evidence regarding the facts known to NAC is
directed to the question of whether NAC
was "reckless in employing or retaining"
Rogers. For that reason, I am not convinced that the evidence is sufficient to go
to the jury on the question of punitive
damages as to NAC.
In granting a summary judgment for
NAC, the trial court operated on the assumption that NAC could not, under any
circumstances, be held liable for punitive
damages. Therefore, it did not have occasion to closely scrutinize the facts to see
whether, viewed in a light most favorable
to the plaintiff, they could satisfy section
909(b)'s requirements. Now that we have
corrected the trial court's misimpression as
to the law and have set out the appropriate
standard for determining NAC's possible
liability, the matter should be remanded to
the trial court to permit the parties to
properly present the issue and the trial
court to determine whether the evidence is
sufficient to go to the jury.
[6] My final concern is with the issue
addressed in Part IV of Justice Durham's
opinion, the existence of and rules for implementing a cause of action for negligent
infliction of emotional distress. I agree
that this cause of action does exist in Utah,
as the trial court held. However, I depart
from Justice Durham with regard to the
legal standard by which such a cause of
action is to be defined in Utah. Her opinion surveys the law of other states—a helpful exercise—but it declines to choose from
among the various possible rules because
all seem satisfied in this case. If we were
to do no more, courts and counsel would be
left entirely without satisfactory guidance

in dealing with all cases but the present
one. We cannot permit every claim for
negligent infliction of emotional distress to
go to a jury under such varying standards
as each trial judge may choose. We have a
practical obligation to articulate understandable standards and to impose workable limits for use in the Utah courts. In
the exercise of that function, I think it best
to adopt as the test for determining liability for the negligent infliction of emotional
distress the standards set forth in section
313 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
(1965), as explained in the comments accompanying that section.
I recognize that some of the limitations
inherent in the "zone of danger'' rule of
section 313 are hard to justify on a purely
theoretical basis. Indeed, I have serious
concerns about the theoretical rationality
of any limits that can be imposed on liability for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Cf. Hackford v. Utah Power &
Light Co., 740 P.2d 1281, 1286 (Utah 1987)
(declining to recognize a loss-of-consortium
cause of action, in part because of the
difficulty of defining rational limiting principles). However, section 313's limitations
seem to strike a fair balance between the
interests those injured have in recovering
damages and the interests of the courts
and the public in predictable rules. At
some future date, we may determine that
there is merit in some of the other approaches surveyed in Justice Durham's
opinion. However, until we have had experience with the cause of action, I conclude
that it is best to take the more conservative
approach and adopt the Restatement rule
as written.
For the foregoing reasons, I join in remanding to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with the opinion of Justice Durham and with this opinion, where it
varies from Justice Durham's.
HALL, C.J., HOWE, Associate C.J.,
and STEWART, J., concur in the
concurring opinion of ZIMMERMAN, J.
(O
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§ 3J3

$ 3 1 3 . Emotional Distress Unintended
(1) If the actor unintentionally causes emotional distress to another, he is subject to liability to the other
for resulting illness or bodily harm if the actor
(a) should have realized that his conduct involved
an unreasonable risk of causing the distress, otherwise
than by knowledge of the harm or peril of a third person, and
(b) from facts known to him should have realized
that the distress, if it were caused, might result in illness or bodily harm.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) has no application to illness or bodily harm of another which is
caused by emotional distress arising solely from harm or
peril to a third person, unless the negligence of the
actor has otherwise created an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to the other.
See Reporter's Notes*
Comment on Subsection (1):
a. The rule stated in this Section does not give protection to mental and emotional tranquillity in itself. In general,
as stated in § 436 A, there is no liability where the actor's negligent conduct inflicts only emotional distress, without resulting
bodily harm or any other invasion of the other's interests* Such
emotional distress is important only in so far as its existence
involves a risk of bodily harm, and as affecting the damages
recoverable if bodily harm is sustained. See § 903.
b. The rule stated in this Section is unnecessary to make
the actor's conduct negligent and, therefore, to subject him to
liability if the actor should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of causing bodily harm in some other manner, such
as by immediate impact. As to the effect which is to be given
to the fact that the act negligent because otherwise threatemHST
bodily harm results in the harm solely through the effect of the
actor's conduct upon the mind or emotions of the other, see
§436.
c. The rule stated in this Section which determines the
liability of a person who negligently subjects another to emotional distress likely to cause physical consequences differs from
the rule stated in § 312, which determines the liability of one
• • • Appendix for Baportor's TXotm*, Court Citations, and Cross B«f«r«&c«a
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who intentionally subjects another thereto in one particular.
As is stated in Comment d under § 312, the actor who intentionally subjects another to emotional distress may under some
circumstances take the risk that the other may, unknown to him,
have a resistance to emotional strain which is less than that of the
ordinary man although characteristic of a recognized minority
of human beings. On the other hand, one who unintentionally
but negligently subjects another to such an emotional distress
does not take the risk of any exceptional physical sensitiveness to emotion which the other may have unless the circumstances known to the actor should apprise him of it. Thus,
_one who negligently drives an automobile through a city street
in a manner likely merely to "startle a pedestrian on a sidewalk, is not required to take into account the possibility that
the latter may be so constituted that the slight mental disurbance
will bring about an illness.
Illustrations:
1. A is employed to drive B to a hospital. He is
informed that B is desperately ill. Nonetheless, he drives
at a rapid rate of speed and cuts in and out of traffic. He
thereby puts B in such fear of a collision that B suffers a
serious increase in her illness. A is subject to liability
toB.
2. Under the facts assumed in Illustration 1, A would
not be liable to B if he had no reason to know of B's illness.
Comment on Subsection (2):
d. The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies only where
the negligent conduct of the actor threatens the other with emotional distress likely to result in bodily harm because of the
other's fright, shock, or other emotional disturbance, arising out
of fear for his own safety, or the invasion of his own interests. It has no application where the emotional distress arises
solelv because of harm or peril to a third person, and the negligence of the actor has not threatened the plaintiff with bodily
harm in any other way.
Thus, where the actor negligently runs down and kills a
child in the street, and its mother, in the immediate vicinity,
witnesses the event and suffers severe emotional distress re*
suiting in a heart attack or other bodily harm to her, she cannot
Ssa Appsadlx for Btportex's Hotss, Court Citations, and Cross Bsfsrsaos*
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recover for such bodily harm unless she was herself in the path
of the vehicle, or was in some other manner threatened with
bodily harm to herself otherwise than through the emotional
distress at the peril to her child.
As to the rule to be applied where the other is so threatened
with bodily harm in another manner, and instead suffers emotional distress at the peril or harm of a third person, which results in bodily harm to the other, see § 436,
TOPIC 7. DUTIES OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
Scope Note: The duties to take positive action imposed by
common law are generally duties to act with reasonable care in
order to give to others the aid or protection which the performance of the duty would afford them. The words "reasonable
care'* are here used to denote that the actor is required to do that
which a reasonable man would believe to be necessary to afford
the aid or protection to which the other is entitled, but no more.
There are many cases, however, in which the actor deliberately fails to perform a duty which he knows is vital to the security of another. In such case, his misconduct is often either
intentional, that is, done for the very purpose of harming the
other or with knowledge that harm will certainly result from it
(see § 8 A), or is in reckless disregard of the other's interests
(see §500).
This Topic deals with only a part of the situations in which
there is a duty of protective action. The duty of maintaining
land and structures thereon in safe condition which is imposed
upon the possessor and lessor by virtue of their possession or
of a covenant to repair is stated in §§328E-379, which deal
with the liability of possessors and lessors of land. The duty
of careful custody which is imposed upon possessors and custodians of animate and other chattels likely to escape from the
place where they are put untesa^sarefully guarded is-stated in:
Volume 3. The duties of inspection and disclosure of the defective condition of chattels which are imposed upon those who
use, dispose, or otherwise deal with chattels are stated in §§ 388408. As to the duties which are imposed by legislative enactment, see §§ 286-288 C. The duty to continue services gratuitously rendered or to perform a gratuitous undertaking and the
duty so to control the conduct of third persons as to prevent them
from causing bodily harm to others are stated in this Topic.
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